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Little Johnny can't read, nor can his sister Jane. Even
worse, neither can integrate a differential equation.
Consequently, they cannot find good jobs in a modem econ-
omy; or so the story goes. This is the perceived sad state of
the higher education system in America today. A situation
that the country's politicians would no longer tolerate. And
what is their formula for making Americans better qualified
for the "new" work force: additional or improved centers of
learning, greater funding of college or vocational programs,
mandatory minimum education requirements? No, the
problem will be solved by the Internal Revenue Code ("tax
code" or "Code").' Yes, the tax code, the panacea for all of
America's woes is being called upon yet again2 to remedy a
national crisis. Give the American people some additional
t Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.S., 1969,
Cornell University; J.D., 1972, State University of New York at Buffalo; L.L.M.,
1977, Northwestern University.
1. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-7872 (1997).
2. It is not uncommon for Congress to use the tax code as a means to
encourage certain activities or reduce the cost of necessary outlays by providing
an offsetting tax benefit. The interplay of I.R.C. §105 and §106 (West 1998) is
illustrative of the former. These provisions provide favorable tax treatment for
costs attributable to and distributions from employer sponsored medical plans,
provisions which are clearly responsive to taxpayer needs. Similarly, I.R.C.
§219 (West 1998) originally provided a deduction for all workers willing to save
for their own retirements. This provision directly responded to retirement needs
of workers not provided such benefits to their employees. Also consider I.R.C.
§21 (West 1998) which provides a credit for childcare costs incurred so that the
otherwise custodial parent can go to work. This section and its precursor (I.R.C.
§ 214 repealed effective tax years following 1975 by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504(b)
(1976)) was needed to combat the court rulings that denied parents a trade or
business expense deduction for this type of expense and provide taxpayers the
relief needed to make entering the workforce worthwhile. See, e.g., Smith v.
Comm'r. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), af/d per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940);
O'Connor v. Comm'r., 6 T.C. 323 (1946))
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tax benefits for higher education expenses, and the problem
will disappear.
Although somewhat tongue-in-cheek, the above
suggestion is rooted in an eerie reality. Conferring special
tax benefits for higher education expenses is no longer
trapped in the theoretical throes of determining the proper
place human capital has in the tax system.3 This erstwhile
significant policy concern was rendered academic by the
rush of politicians promoting their plans designed to help
citizens pay for college expenses. A more cynical view
suggests there are other motivations afoot, those that
equate a popular-sounding tax benefit with re-election
votes. In any event, the pretense of sound tax policy may
well have fallen prey to political concerns as our elected
officials sallied forth with a variety of crisis-solving tax
plans. Although the proposals came in different shapes and
sizes, each was designed to provide tax relief for "quali-
fying" higher education expenses. After the requisite
political haggling, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ("TRA
'97")5 emerged with a number of new education-based ini-
tiatives. These now will work with the pre-existing rules
that offered limited relief to form the basis for an education
incentive tax policy. Whether this hodge-podge of tax
provisions best meet the needs of the country, its students,
and their financial sponsors remains to be seen. Given its
significance from both a policy and practical perspective,
the new rules deserve to be examined. When the testing is
3. The tax treatment of human capital as it relates to education expenses
has been the subject of much debate over the years. Some pieces in the rich
literature include: Loretta Collins Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education
Expenditures: An Unfair Investment Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 621
(1990); David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing an Ideal
Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 793 (1992);
Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs-Or Why Costs of
Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927
(1993); Marcus Schoenfeld, The Educational Expense Deduction: The Need for a
Rational Approach, 27 VILL. L. REV. 237 (1982); David S. Davenport The
'Proper' Taxation of Human Capital, 52 TAx NOTES 1401 (Sept. 16, 1991); Brian
E. Lebowitz, On the Mistaxation of Investment in Human Capital, 52 TAX NOTES
825 (Aug. 12, 1991).
4. For an analysis of these proposals, see infra Section III. It is worth noting
that providing some type of tax benefit is not a novel idea. For a review of the
legislative "ups and downs" of prior attempts in this area, see John K McNulty,
Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances for
Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-14 (1973).
5. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
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over, some thoughts on how to improve the benefits will be
advanced. The primary emphasis will be on restructuring
the system to promote meaningful self-help funding oppor-
tunities. The proposals are perhaps better suited to meet
the projected financial goals, especially insofar as targeting
the benefits to the students themselves is concerned.
II. PRE-1997 OPERATING RULES
It is well settled that an expense is not deductible
unless the Code provides otherwise.' The Code specifically
disallows deductions for all personal, living or family
expenses.7 As a general rule, college costs are considered
personal, and therefore, non-deductible expenses.8 Nonethe-
6. See JACOB MERTENS, JR.., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON
§ 3.50, at 77 (1991) (stating that deductions "will be allowed only when granted
by clear language"); see also New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,
440 (1934) (finding "[wihether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed
depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can
any particular deduction be allowed."); First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 115 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1940) (holding that a taxpayer has no
constitutional right to deductions, and must rely upon a statutory provision
specifically allowing the claimed deduction).
7. I.R.C. § 262 (West 1998). The section provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise
expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal,
living, or family expenses." Id. Even expenses that are arguably for business
purposes may not be deductible if they are too personal in nature. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Comm'r 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1940). The court disallowed a deduction for a couples' expenses incurred in
employing a nanny for their child. See id. The expense was deemed of a
personal nature in spite of Mrs. Smith's argument that but for the expenses she
would be unable to work and earn income. See id. Certain childcare expenses
now qualify for a tax credit courtesy of congressional action. See I.R.C. § 24
(West 1998).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(9) (1997) expressly interprets § 262 to provide
that "[e]xpenditures made by a taxpayer in obtaining an education or in
furthering his education are not deductible unless they qualify under section
162 and § 1.162-5 (relating to trade or business expenses)." See Carroll v.
Comm'r, 51 T.C. 213 (1968), affd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that a
policeman could not deduct the costs of taking philosophy courses as these were
personal expenses, and were not the ordinary and necessary expenses of
carrying on a trade or business). In Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), the
Court in dictum suggested that education expenses could not meet the
"ordinary" test of I.R.C. § 162 and therefore were not deductible. The Court
stated that to allow the deduction at bar would be to "open the door to many
bizarre analogies" including:
Another man conceives the notion that he will be able to practice his
vocation with greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich
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less, some educational expenses have long qualified for
favorable tax treatment. In certain instances a deduction
can be allowed;9 in others, exclusions from or deferrals of
income are permitted. ° Notwithstanding the introduction of
the new tax incentives, these older benefits continue to
remain in effect. Stringent and strictly enforced limitations,
however, make these "old-timers" neither universally
available nor easily obtained.
The principal opportunity for education expense tax
relief was the "trade or business" deduction permitted
under Section 162 of the Code." This provision permits a
deduction for all reasonable "ordinary and necessary"
his culture. Forthwith the price of his education becomes an expense of
the business, reducing the income subject to taxation. There is little
difference between these expenses and those in controversy here.
Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will of
an old partnership... money spent in acquiring them is well and
wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a
business.
Id. at 115-16.
Denying education expenses deductibility is not of recent vintage. The
government took this position as early as 1921 when it issued two rulings
denying taxpayers a deduction for such expenses. In O.D. 892, 4.C.B. 209
(1921), a teacher's deduction for summer course expenses was disallowed, and
in O.D. 984, 5 C.B. 171 (1921), a doctor was denied a deduction for post-
graduate courses. For an historical review of the early history of the effort to
deduct education expenses, see Jay Katz, "The Deductibility of Educational
Costs: Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to Take Your Education So
Personally?" 17 VA. TAX. REV. 1, 16-35 (1997).
9. See infra notes 11-27 and accompanying text. For a more complete history
of the development of the deductibility of education expenses, see Daniel I.
Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform
Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 899-905 (1974).
10. See infra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
11. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1998) provides that "[t~here shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business..." and then lists several
types of expenses so deductible, but which are inapplicable here. Treas. Reg. §
1.162-5(a) (1997) has interpreted I.R.C. § 162(a) to provide that educational
expenses which are incurred as "ordinary and necessary business expenses" are
deductible if the education is for the improvement or maintenance of skills
required by the taxpayer in his or her trade, business, or employment, or are
deductible if the education sought is required by the individual's employer or
law or regulations which again concern the individual's current, established
employment. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i) (1997) limits the deduction, stating
that it is inapplicable in cases where the education is sought merely to satisfy
minimum requirements to gain employment in the first instance, or where the
education sought qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business.
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business-related expenses." Thus, a deduction for education
expenses is available for the taxpayer who can show the
proper nexus between the education expense and her trade
or business. Unfortunately, the section has some signi-
ficant, self-imposed barriers to deductibility.
First, and foremost, in order to obtain any benefit the
taxpayer must be engaged in a trade or business." This
effectively eliminates the deduction for many full-time
students since being a student is neither a trade nor a
business. Some students (either full-time or part-time) may
work as employees or be conducting their own businesses.
Nonetheless, students who work or workers who go to
school may fare no better than their non-working fellows.
To be deductible, the expenses must be connected to the
trade or business.'4 Students pursuing a general college
education usually are hard pressed to demonstrate their
coursework is specifically related to any of the myriad types
of jobs that they may hold while in school. Even if a student
can "connect" the education to the job, administrative rules
further require the taxpayer to show that the education
either (1) improves or maintains skills necessary for the
job, 5 or (2) is required by the employer. 6 Whereas
individual, isolated courses might satisfy one of these tests,
normally an entire education cannot.
Satisfying the administrative test is not enough; an
additional roadblock exists. The education must not qualify
the taxpayer for his or her chosen trade, or a new trade or
business.' This effectively denies deductibility for much
12. See I.R.C. § 162 (West 1998).
13. See Frank v. Coim'r, 20 T.C. 511, 513 (1953) (finding where a husband
and wife who were employed at a newspaper were not allowed to deduct
expenses incurred in traveling and searching for a newspaper to purchase and
run, since these expenses were not "in connection with" or "in the course of' the
trade or business of the employment they had at the time the expenses were
incurred); see also McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57, 60 (1944) (holding that a
judge was not allowed to deduct re-election expenses as these were incurred not
in carrying on the trade or business of judging, but "in trying to be a judge.")
The question of whether or not a taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business is
one of fact. See Ford v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1300, 1307 (1971), affd, 487 F.2d 1025
(9th Cir. 1973).
14. See Kornhauser v. Comm'r, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928); Noland v. Comm'r,
269 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1959), affg T.C. Memo 1958-60; Hynes v. Comm'r,
74 T.C. 1266, 1289 (1980); Schulz v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 401, 405 (1951).
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1998).
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2) (1998).
17. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2), (3)(i) (1998); see also Sharon v. Comm'r,
1999] 879
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post-baccalaureate degree work and all professional
degrees. Moreover, the restriction has been applied even if
the taxpayer had no intention of ever entering into the new
trade or business. Thus, for example, in Wilmshurst v.
Commissioner,8 the court ruled that a business executive
could not deduct the cost of his law school education pur-
sued solely for the purposes of helping him operate his
commercial businesses, despite the fact he never intended
to practice law. The education qualified him to enter the
new orofession, and that was sufficient to deny the deduc-
tion.
The Code also allows deductions for expenses incurred
in a variety of income-related activities that do not rise to
the level of a trade or business.2" Education expenses can be
deducted under the aegis of Section 212 of the Code.2' The
same rules, however, that bar deductions under the Code's
Section 162 apply equally to Section 212.22 Demonstrating
that one's entire college education is directly related to the
Section 212 activity will be most difficult, if not impossible.
Education expenses that qualify for a deduction under
Section 212 tend to be individual courses of a special nature
that directly tie into a specific Section 212 activity.
Consequently, Section 212 does not offer a serious oppor-
66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976), affd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978); Vannier
v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 315 (1997).
18. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (1982).
19. See id. at 1311; see also Glenn v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 270 (1974) (finding
that a public accountant was not allowed to deduct expenses incurred in taking
refresher courses which went towards qualifying him to be a Certified Public
Accountant); Bodley v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1357, 1360 (1971) (stating it is
immaterial whether or not the taxpayer does in fact enter the new trade or
business qualified for by the education).
20. See I.R.C. § 212(1), (2) (West 1998). I.R.C. § 212 specifically allows
individuals to deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year... for the production or collection of income; ... for the
management conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of
income; or... in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax." See id.
21. Id.
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(o)-(p) (1998), which specifically applies I.R.C. §
162, providing that:
[t]he provisions of section 212 are not intended in any way to disallow
expenses which would otherwise be allowable under section 162 and
the regulations thereunder.... The deduction of a payment will be
disallowed under section 212 if the payment is of a type for which a
deduction would be disallowed under section 162(c), (f), or (g) and the
regulations thereunder in the case of a business expense.
880 [Vol. 47
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tunity for taxpayers to deduct college education expenses.
Even when the tests for deductibility are met, other
rules can operate to curtail the benefit. For example,
Section 274 of the tax code has the potential to limit the
deductibility of certain otherwise qualifying educational
expenses. The provision is designed to deny or limit a
deduction for those expenses that have some business
aspects to them but are deemed to be incurred mostly for
personal entertainment purposes.2 Additionally, some com-
putational tax rules also serve to limit otherwise available
benefits. First, all deductible education expenses for
employees, and for any taxpayer, most of those deductible
under Section 212, can only be taken if the taxpayer
itemizes deductions.' Second, these expenses will be con-
sidered miscellaneous itemized deductions. 25 As such, only
that portion of the expense(s) that, when aggregated with
other miscellaneous itemized deductions, exceeds two
percent of adjusted gross income can be deducted.26 Finally,
the deductible amount may be further limited by another
rule which can reduce by three percent the amount of
otherwise allowable itemized deductions for high-income
taxpayers.27
Although payments made for college education may be
difficult to qualify as deductions under these sections,
amounts received by taxpayers that are used for education
costs have greater potential for generating tax benefits.
Scholarships are a prime example. They are excluded from
income28 provided the payment is not merely disguised
23. See I.R.C. § 274(h) (West 1998) (prescribing additional rules for the
deductibility of expenses for attending "a convention, seminar or similar
meeting" held outside of North America). Thus, summer education programs in,
for instance, Europe or Asia, must overcome additional obstacles to generate
deductible expenses.
24. See I.R.C. § 63(e) (West 1998) (allowing taxpayers the opportunity to
elect to take all of the deductions allowed by Chapter 1 in lieu of the standard
deduction of I.R.C. § 63(c) (West 1998)).
25. See I.R.C. § 67(b) (West 1998).
26. See I.R.C. § 67(a) (West 1998).
27. See I.R.C. § 68 (West 1998). This section provides that individuals with
income in excess of a certain amount ($50,000 for married persons filing
separately, $100,000 for other individuals, both figures to be adjusted for
inflation), shall have their itemized deductions reduced by either three percent
of the amount of the individual's income earned in "excess of' the amount, but
in no event shall the reduction exceed 80% of the total amount of otherwise
allowable itemized deductions. See id.
28. See I.R.C. § 117(a) (West 1998).
19991 881
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salary for a student's rendition of services to the payer. "
Other excludable items include qualified education assis-
tance programs,3 0 certain working condition fringe bene-
fits,"' and interest paid on special U.S. Government EE
Savings Bonds ("EE bonds") used to pay qualified education
expenses." Each benefit has limited availability. The first
two can only benefit taxpayers that have the good fortune to
work for employers willing and able to provide and fund the
programs. The EE bond interest exclusion, although facially
applicable to all, in practice assists few taxpayers; and then,
only on a limited basis. The exclusion only applies to the
interest earned on the EE bonds. Given their relatively
modest rate of return, the earnings will not be particularly
large.3 Even if the bonds are held for a decade or longer,
absent substantial original investments, there will be rel-
atively little excludable interest. Additionally, the benefit is
pegged to the taxpayer's income level at the time the benefit
is claimed, and phases-out entirely at surprisingly low
29. See I.R.C. § 117(c) (West 1998); see also Godfrey v. Comm'r, T.C.M.
(CCH) 1738 (1998).
30. See I.R.C. § 127 (West 1998) (providing that an employee may exclude
from gross income, up to a limit of $5250, amounts paid or expenses incurred by
his or her employer pursuant to a written plan providing such employee with
educational assistance). Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §
221(a), 11 Stat. 810 amended I.R.C. § 127(d) (West 1998) extends the
termination date of the benefit from expenses incurred after tax years
beginning after May 31, 1997 to May 31, 2000. The Education Savings and
School Excellence Act of 1998, H.R. 2646, sought to extend the benefit through
December 31, 2002, but the bill was vetoed by the President. See H.R. 2646,
105t Cong. (1998).
31. See I.R.C. § 132(a) (West 1998) (providing rules for excluding qualified
fringe benefits from income). For a complete discussion of the "fringe benefit"
rules, see generally MERTENS., supra note 6, at § 7:136-70.
32. See I.R.C. § 135 (West 1998) (allowing a taxpayer to exclude from income
the interest portion of redeemed United States savings bonds which are used to
pay for "qualified higher education expenses"). These expenses are defined as
"tuition and fees required for the enrollment or attendance... at an eligible
educational institution." I.R.C. § 135(c)(2)(A). These expenses include
contributions to qualified state tuition programs. See I.R.C. § 135(c)(2)(C) (as
amended by TEA '97 § 211(c)). If the proceeds from the redemption exceed the
qualified expenses, then the exclusion is limited. See I.R.C. § 135(b)(1) (West
1998).
33. The interest rates and redemption values for series EE bonds are
computed according to equations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury.
See 31 C.F.R. § 351.2 (1998) (discussing offering of United States Savings
Bonds, series EE, 31 C.F.R. § 351.2, at pt. 351 (1998), as authorized by 5 U.S.C.
§ 301; 12 U.S.C. § 391 (1988); 31 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994)).
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thresholds."4 A taxpayer in a qualifying tax bracket at the
time of purchase will probably have to make sacrifices to
buy the bonds. Ironically, she may discover that when the
time comes to redeem them to pay for education expenses
her financial position may have improved to the point she
no longer qualifies for the exclusion. It is probably fair to
say that none of these benefits provide meaningful assis-
tance for the majority of deserving taxpayers.
In response to these barriers to tax assistance, tax-
payers have pursued self-help remedies to fund college edu-
cation costs. Most efforts involve investing in tax favored
vehicles (tax free bonds 35 annuities,36 or growth securities3 ),
borrowing (tax favored 8 or otherwise), shifting income to
the children to benefit from their lower marginal tax rates, 9
34. If the taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income exceeds $40,000
($60,000 for a joint filer), then the exclusion is reduced "by the amount which
bears the same ratio to the amount which would be so excludable as such excess
bears to $15,000 ($30,000 in the case of a joint return)." I.R.C. § 135(b)(2) (West
1998). Note that I.R.C. § 135 was amended by the Small Business Job
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188 (1996). See I.R.C. § 135 (West 1998); see also
I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1998) (providing that the cost-of-living adjustment
under I.R.C. § 1(f)(3) (West 1998), which is applied to the $40,000 and $60,000
limits, is to be read substituting "calendar year 1989" for "calendar year 1992").
35. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (West 1998) (excluding income interest on state and
local (county, municipal, etc.) bonds, provided the bond is not excepted under
I.R.C. § 103(b) (West 1998)).
36. Annuities can be effective tax-deferral vehicles that maximize internal
growth on funds remaining within the annuity. The funds can be withdrawn in
a tax-favored manner that allows a non-taxable recovery of investment with
each payment. See generally I.R.C. § 72 (West 1998).
37. Growth securities tend to be issued by companies that re-invest earnings
and pay only a small, if any, dividend. Consequently, as the value of the
security increases there is not any adverse tax exposure (i.e., any dividends to
include in income and unrealized appreciation). When the security is sold, the
gain is realized, but can qualify for favorable capital gains rates. See I.R.C. § 1
(h) (West 1998).
38. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (West 1998) (allowing a deduction for otherwise
non-deductible personal (i.e., non-business) interest that is "qualified residence
interest" (i.e., interest paid on a note secured by the taxpayer's residence)); see
also I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 1998).
39. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e) (West 1997) (establishing a graduated rate system
whereby the marginal tax rate, the rate applied to the taxpayer's highest
taxable income amount, increases with taxable income). In most instances
parents will have taxable incomes greater than their children. Thus, tax
savings can be accomplished by shifting the tax consequences down to the
children and their lower marginal tax rates. Unfortunately, I.R.C. § 1(g) (West
1998) thwarts many of these efforts by forcing children under the age of 14 to
apply their parents' marginal tax rate to a portion of their unearned income.
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or a combination of all three.
Another popular strategy is to participate in state
operated pre-paid tuition plans." Although a creative ap-
proach to meeting college costs, originally these plans came
with adverse tax consequences. The forerunner of these
state tuition plans received a mixed treatment when first
reviewed by the Internal Revenue Service.4 On the down
side, contributions to the plan were not tax deductible.
Distributions from the plan in the form of education
benefits were income to the plan beneficiaries (usually the
children and not the parent contributors) to the extent the
value of the benefits received exceeded the contributions
made (the contributor's basis in the contract). In essence,
earnings on the contributions were taxed when used, but in
return, either compounded growth on a deferred basis or a
special tuition guarantee was obtained. This could be
particularly beneficial if the tax consequences were shifted
to a lower marginal-rate taxpayer." The potential benefit,
however, came at a cost. The contributor was deemed to
have made taxable gifts to the beneficiary in the amount of
his contribution.43 This treatment was consistent with
allowing the income tax consequences to be shifted to the
beneficiary. But neither the gift tax annual exclusion44 nor
the special exclusion available for education payments
made on behalf of a third party45 was held to apply. Thus,
contributing to the plan gave rise to adverse gift tax
consequences. Lastly, the government ruled that the
See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the so-called
"kiddie tax."
40. At least a dozen states have adopted pre-paid tuition programs. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 16-33c-1 et seq. (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.803 et seq. (Michie
1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.552 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-600 et seq.
(1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164A.300 et seq. (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3129.4 (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 390.1421 et
seq. (West 1997); OmIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3334.01 et seq. (West 1998); TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.6001 et seq. (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 23-38.75 et seq.
(Michie 1997).
41. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988).
42. See supra note 39.
43. See I.R.C. § 2501(a) (West 1998) (imposing a gift tax on taxable gifts as
defined in I.R.C. § 2503 (West 1998)).
44. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1998) (excluding the first $10,000 of value of
any present interest from the computation of taxable gifts).
45. See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (West 1998) (excluding the amount of any "qualified
transfer" from any gift tax accounting). See also I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2) (West 1998)
(providing that direct payments of tuition are "qualified transfers").
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earnings on the contributions were income to the trust even
though it was an adjunct of the state. In Michigan v. United
States,46 however, the Sixth Circuit held the trust's earnings
were properly excludable from income. The government's
other positions were not challenged, and thus, the decision
offered no relief to private taxpayers. Subsequently,
Congress gave its blessing to state operated pre-paid tuition
plans. 7 The new rules provided that plan benefits were not
income to the beneficiaries even if the benefit value
exceeded the amount of the contributions.48  The
contributions qualified for the gift tax education expense
exclusion and thus were not transfers subject to the gift
tax,49 but remained non-deductible for income tax purposes.
TRA '97 reworked the tax treatment for these plans making
them more attractive college funding opportunities."
III. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
A. The Proposals
Creating tax breaks for college expenses was the
political football of the 1990s. Everyone seemed to have a
plan to assist taxpaying voters in their efforts to put
themselves, their spouses, or their children through college.
Amidst the crush of proposals two basic themes emerged.
One provided "up front" tax relief by allowing qualifying
expenditures to generate a presently usable tax deduction
or credit. The other "back-ended" the tax benefit by ex-
cluding from income the earnings on the funds used to pay
college expenses. Each theme has a number of variations.
President Clinton was the chief proponent of so-called
front-end benefits. He initially proposed an education
46. 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994).
47. See The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88 §
1806(a) (introducing I.R.C. § 529 (West 1998) into the Code). This Act provided
rules for the tax treatment of contributions to, earnings on, and distributions
from Qualified State Tuition Programs. See id.
48. See I.R.C. § 529(c) (West 1998).
49. See id.
50. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 211(a), (b)(3)(A)(i)-




expense deduction51 and suggested institutin, a tax credit
for the first two years of community college.2 The former
made an early appearance, but the latter did not come until
final legislative drafting. The deduction initiative was a
well-crafted proposal. It addressed a number of critical
issues, including, what is deductible, who takes the
deduction, and how the benefit fits into the overall tax
structure. Ultimately, this approach was dropped in favor of
a dual credit proposal."
"Back-end" benefits provide indirect tax relief. Instead
of focusing on the expense payment itself, the benefit is
given to income on investments or interest on debt incurred
to make the payment. Some proposals would have exempted
from income earnings on funds put aside in special accounts
to pay for future college costs. This approach mirrors the
benefit accorded interest earned on qualifying federal
savings bonds. However, instead of being limited to the
special federal bonds, the taxpayer would be given a wider
range of investment options.
One of the earliest of these tax-free pocketbook plans
was dubbed the "Family Savings Account."5 Earnings
generated in the account, if used to pay college education
expenses, were to be tax exempt. The account would be
created through non-deductible contributions limited to no
more than $2,000 per year.5" A variation on this theme
increased the amount of the allowable contributions (up to
$5,000 per year for married couples and $2,500 per year for
individuals), but would have required the funds to be kept
in the account for seven years and phased-out the benefits
for upper-level taxpayers ($120,000 for joint filers and
51. The idea first appeared in the BALANCED BUDGET BILL OF 1995 § 13012,
and then again in the REVENUE RECONCILIATION BILL OF 1996 § 9102.
52. This proposal did not surface in a concrete legislative form, but instead
was a "talking point" as the "education expense" discussions continued. This
idea was adopted in the form of the Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning
credits. See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
54. See S. Res. 2023 § 1 (1990), 136 CONG. REc. S407-04 (1990); S. Res. 2071
§ 292, 136 CONG. REC. S881-02 (1990).
55. S. Res. 2071 § 292, 136 CONG. REC. S881-02. The Family Savings
Account as originally conceived would have allowed tax-free withdrawals of the
non-deductible contributions and earnings thereon for a home purchase by a
first-time homebuyer. See id.
56. See 136 CONG. REC. S881-89 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990); see also Contract
with America Tax Relief Bill of 1995, H.R. 1215, § 103.
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$60,000 for individuals).57 Neither proposal was adopted.
Subsequently, the Family Savings Account plan was re-
incarnated as originally proposed under the name the
"American Dream Savings Account."58  As with its
predecessor, the plan had a major drawback. These types of
accounts offered no assistance for those unable to fund
them, and thus were of dubious value in seeking to provide
universally available relief. A college savings account plan
was finally enacted,59 but on a much smaller scale than
discussed. Also, perhaps as a trade-off, distributions from
pre-existing retirement accounts could be made for college
expenses without incurring an early 
withdrawal penalty.
60
Another back-end benefit plan sought to give tax relief
for any interest paid on loans that was used to pay
education expenses. Normally such interest would be
considered personal and non-deductible.61  One bill
suggested an above-the-line deduction be allowed for all
education loan interest, with the benefit gradually phased-
out for joint return filers having adjusted gross incomes in
excess of $45,000.62 A Senate amendment to that plan would
have allowed a tax credit for up to sixty months of
education loan interest paid, capging the benefit at $500
per loan for each college student. The proposal conferring
a tax benefit on the interest paid on education loans is
appealing because it can be made available to all taxpayers.
However, to some degree, it might be negatively viewed by
individuals who have skimped and saved for years and are
using after-tax dollars to pay for college costs. They will not
57. See Contract with America Tax Relief Bill of 1995, H.R. 1215, 104th
Cong. § 103.
58. H.R. 6, 10e Cong. (1995). See also four different versions of H.R. 6, Feb.
6, 1995; Feb. 12, 1995; Feb. 13, 1995; and Feb. 14, 1995. Id.
59. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 213(a), 111 Stat. 813
(1998) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 530 (West 1998) (creating the Education
Individual Retirement Accounts ("Ed IRAs")). Ed IRAs are discussed infra notes
103-117 and accompanying text.
60. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 203(b), 111 Stat. 809
(1998) (amending I.R.C. § 72(t) (West 1998) by adding a new subsection (7)).
61. See generally I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1998) (allowing a deduction for
interest paid during the year); I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)-(2) (West 1998) (prohibiting
personal interest from being deductible under subsection (a), but subsection
(h)(2) identifies exceptions to the prohibition). College interest expenses are not
an identified exception. See id.
62. See Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1995, H.R. 2491, 104e Cong. § 11004.
63. See CONF. REPT. OF BALANCED BUDGET BILL OF 1994, H.R. 2491 (1995).
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need to borrow to pay for these costs, and may feel penal-
ized for having had the foresight to prepare for the future.
Of course, these taxpayers could also take out loans for
college costs and receive the tax benefit if they so desired.
The money saved for college could then be put to other uses.
But this is not a satisfactory response for many because
borrowing comes with transaction costs over and above the
interest charge. These costs are not deductible and would
serve to reduce any available tax benefit. The back-end
approaches have serious fairness drawbacks that make
them undesirable as the principal method of providing
college expense relief. Nonetheless, an education loan
interest deduction did make its way into law.'
IV. TRA '97
TRA '97 brought forth a diverse variety of tax benefits
associated with higher education, including new ideas,65 as
well as some wrinkles on existing ones.6 The most notable
initiative may be the tax credits for qualifying expenses, but
deductions and deferrals also were made a part of the mix.
The end result is a hodge-podge of often mutually exclusive
benefits. Now taxpayers are forced not only to decipher the
sections, but also to do so in the context of their own
situations so as to chose from among the avail-able benefits.
An already overly complex tax system be-comes further
complicated. A review of the new rules should assist in
evaluating the overall usefulness of the legis-lation, and
help predict its success.
Perhaps the most talked about innovations are the
Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits, now
permitted by the new tax code section 25A.67 These
innovations, although independent of one another, work
hand in hand to produce a somewhat generous benefit.
64. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202, 111 Stat. 806
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 221 (West 1998)) (allowing qualifying education
loan interest to be deducted). See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 67-94, 103-17 and accompanying text. For an overview of
the new rules together with a set of "Question and Answer" explanations see
I.R.S. Notice 97-60, 1997-46 I.R.B. 1.
66. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. See also I.R.S. Notice 97-
60, 1997-46 I.R.B. 1.
67. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202, 111 Stat. 799
(1998) (adding Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning Credits to the Code).
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The Hope Scholarship permits a maximum $2,000
credit 68 for each of a student's first two years of post-high
school education.69 Both college and vocational training
expenses may qualify, provided the student is enrolled in an"eligible educational institution."7" The credit is limited to
"qualified tuition and related expenses" of an "eligible
student" who is carrying at least fifty percent of the "work
load required for the course of study" being pursued.7'
Qualified expenses include tuition and fees required for
enrollment in the student's course of study, excluding
student activity fees, athletic fees, and other charges not
actually related to the course of study.72 Of particular
interest is that the provision specifically allows the credit
for qualified expenses paid on behalf of the taxpayer-
student,73 the taxpayer's student-spouse,74 or the taxpayer's
student dependent. The latter rule permits parents to take
the credit for their children's qualified expenses, provided
the children are eligible dependents under Section 151 of
the Code.76
68. See I.R.C. § 25A(b)(1)(A), (B) (West 1998). This section computes the
credit in a two step process. See id. The student's entire first $1,000 of qualified
expenses are added to 50% of the remaining qualified expenses. Id. However,
the latter amount cannot exceed $1,000. See I.R.C. § 25A(b)(4) (West 1998) that
imposes a limit equal to twice the amount specified in I.R.C. § 25A(b)(1)(A)
(West 1998) so that when the 50% allowance of I.R.C. § 25A(b)(1)(B) (West
1998) is applied the result is an amount equal to the subsection (b)(1)(A)
amount. The tortuous language is needed to simplify the computations in future
years when the maximum credit amount increases by a cost of living adjust-
ment determined under I.R.C. § 1(f)(3) (West 1998). The amounts increase for
taxable years starting after 2001. See I.R.C. § 25A(h)(1) (West 1998).
69. See I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(A), (C) (West 1988).
70. I.R.C. § 25A(f)(2) (defining "eligible educational institution" with
reference to the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1088).
71. I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(B), (b)(3) (West 1998).
72. See I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1) (West 1998).
73. See I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(A)(i) (West 1998).
74. See I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1998).
75. See I.R.C. § 25A(f(1)(A)(iii) (West 1998).
76. See I.R.C. § 151 (West 1998) (allowing a dependency exemption for any
child of the taxpayer who qualifies as the taxpayer's dependent); I.R.C. §
152(a)(1), (2) (West 1998) (defining "dependent" to include a child or stepchild
for whom the taxpayer has provided over one half of the support for the year);
I.R.C. § 151(c)(1)(A), (B) (West 1998) (stating that a person whose gross income
exceeds the exemption amount cannot be another taxpayer's dependent unless
the child is either under 19, or both under 24 and a student); I.R.C. §
151(c)(4)(A), (B) (defining "student" for this purpose to be a child who is either a
full-time student or pursuing a special on-farm training program).
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The Lifetime Learning credit allows a maximum $1,000
tax credit (targeted to increase to $2,000 in 2003)1 for
qualified expenses. Unlike the Hope Scholarship, the
Lifetime Learning benefit can be taken for any year of
study.78 Moreover, the qualified expenses are more broadly
defined than their Hope Scholarship counterpart. Qualified
expenses under the Lifetime Learning Benefit are"expenses with respect to any course of instruction at an
eligible institution to acquire or improve job skills."
(emphasis supplied). 9 Thus, there is no need for the student
to be matriculated in a formal course of study or to carry a
pre-set course load in order to qualify for the credit.
These differences aside, the two credits are closely
related. First, otherwise qualifying expenses cannot be used
for both credits; the taxpayer must apply them to the Hope
Scholarship credit if the student qualifies for it.8
Consequently, if the taxpayer qualifies for the maximum
Hope Scholarship credit, a Lifetime Learning credit is
unavailable for that year. Second, both credits are phased-
out for higher-income taxpayers based on a "modified
adjusted gross income."8 ' A complete loss of benefits occurs
at the relatively modest income level of $100,000 for joint
filers and $50,000 for individual filers.82 Third, neither
credit is available for married taxpayers filing separately. 3
Fourth, qualified expenses must be reduced by non-taxable
scholarship amounts or other payments excludable from
income, unless they are received as a gift or inheritance. 4
Fifth, neither credit is available for an expense that is
77. See I.R.C. § 25A(c)(1) (West 1998) (allowing a credit equal to 20% of the
qualified expenses paid during the year and then capping the credit at pre-set
levels).
78. See id. (providing the credit applies to expense incurred "for education
furnished during any academic period... ") (emphasis added).
79. I.R.C. § 25A(c)(2)(B) (West 1998).
80. See I.R.C. § 25A(c)(2)(A) (West 1998).
81. See I.R.C. § 62 (West 1998) (defining "modified gross income" as adjusted
gross income "increased by any amount excluded gross income under section
911, 931, or 933."). Section 911 relates to foreign source income earned by
citizens are residents living abroad; sections 931 and 933 relate to income
earned in U.S. possessions and Puerto Rico, respectively. See also I.R.C. §
25A(d)(3) (West 1998).
82. See I.R.C. § 25A(d)(2) (West 1998).
83. See I.R.C. § 25A(g)(6) (West 1998).
84. See I.R.C. § 25A(g)(2) (West 1998).
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taken as a deduction pursuant to another Code section.85
Sixth, in no event can the taxpayer take either credit in a
year in which an election is made to exclude from income a
distribution from an Education Individual Retirement
Account ("Ed IRA")88 that is used to pay qualified higher
education expenses. 7
TRA '97 also introduced a deduction for interest paid on
a "qualified education loan."88 "Qualified education loan" is
defined in such a way as to ensure the loan proceeds are
used for education expenses similar to those allowed a
credit under Section 25A of the tax code.89 There is an
income ceiling above which the deduction begins to phase-
out and ultimately is lost entirely."9 Only sixty months of
interest payments are deductible,' and the benefit is not
available at all to a taxpayer who can be claimed as a
dependent by another taxpayer.9 2 Thus, interest on student
loans will not generate deductible interest if the obligated
student is still a dependent of his or her parents, or some
other taxpayer. Notwithstanding the amount of interest
paid, the maximum deductible amount is $1,000 for 1998,
and will increase to $2,500 for tax years 2001 and
thereafter.93 On the plus side, the benefit comes as an
above-the-line deduction, and thus is available regardless of
whether or not the taxpayer itemizes deductions.
TRA '97 enhanced the tax benefits for Qualified State
Tuition Programs ("QSTPs").95 Qualifying expenses now
may include room and board,9 in addition to supplies and
85. See I.R.C. § 25A(g)(5) (West 1998).
86. For a discussion of Education Individual Retirement Accounts see infra
notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
87. See I.R.C. § 25A(e)(2) (West 1998).
88. See I.R.C. § 221 (West 1998), enacted by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202(a), 111 Stat. 806.
89. See generally I.R.C. § 221(e) (West 1998).
90. See I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A), (B) (West 1998) (phasing out the benefit
against a modified adjusted gross income measure, but providing its own special
definition of the term). See also I.R.C. § 25(b)(2)(C) (West 1998).
91. See I.R.C. § 221(d) (West 1998).
92. See I.R.C. § 221(c) (West 1998).
93. See I.R.C. § 221(b)(1) (West 1998).
94. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(17) (West 1998).
95. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 211(b)(3)(A), (B),
111 Stat. 810-11 (making a number of changes to I.R.C. § 529(c) that affect the
tax treatment of account beneficiaries and contributors). For a recent appli-
cation of the new rules see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-25-035 (Mar. 26, 1998).
96. See I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(B) (West 1998), amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of
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equipment necessary for coursework,97 as well as the stan-
dard tuition and fees.98 Contributions to the plan are now
considered gifts,99 but these can qualify for the gift tax
annual exclusion. Moreover, if the contribution in any one
year exceeds the annual exclusion amount for gift tax
purposes, the donor-contributor (parent or other financial
sponsor) may elect to amortize the gift over a five-year
period.0 0 This effectively will give the donor five years'
worth of annual exclusions all at once. Finally, distributions
from QSTPs will no longer be considered gifts from the
contributor for gift tax purposes. 0 '
TRA '97 made two other notable "self-help" changes to
education finding initiatives. First, it liberalized the rules
to allow taxpayers to make penalty-free distributions from
traditional Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRAs") for
qualified higher education expenses.0 2 Second, it created a
new type of account the Education Individual Retirement
Account ("Ed IRA!')."°3 Although the Ed IRA shares some
operational similarities with traditional IRAs, it is not a
retirement vehicle, and unfortunately was poorly named.
"Education Savings Account" and "Personal Education
Expenses Plan" may have been better choices to capture the
intended purpose. Misnomer aside, the Ed IRA is designed
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 211(b)(1), 111 Stat. 811.
97. See I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(A) (West 1998).
98. See id.
99. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(2) (West 1998). Prior to Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
contributions to a QSTP were not considered gifts for gift tax purposes. See
I.R.C. § 529(c)(2) (West 1997); see also Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-34, § 211(b)(3)(A)(i), 111 Stat. 811 (amending I.R.C. § 529(c)(2) to treat the
contributions as completed gifts that are not qualified transfers excused from
gift tax accounting); I.R.C. §§ 529(c)(2)(A), 2503(e) (West 1998).
100. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A)(i) (West 1998), codified by Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 211(b)(3)(A)(i), 111 Stat. 810-11 (making the
contribution "not a future interest," and thus a present interest that can qualify
for the annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(b)).
101. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(A) (West 1998), amended by Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 211(b)(3)(A)(ii), 111 Stat. 810-11.
102. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(1) (West 1998) (imposing a 10% penalty on distrib-
utions from qualified retirement plans, including IRAs, that are to be included
in income); I.R.C. § 72(t)(2) (providing numerous exceptions to the general rule);
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 203(b), 111 Stat. 809 (adding
I.R.C. § 72(t)(7) which includes distributions for "qualified higher education
expenses," as defined in I.R.C. § 529(e)(5), relating to Qualified State Tuition
Programs in the list of exceptions to subsection 72(t)(1)).
103. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 213(a), 111 Stat.
813 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 530 (West 1998)).
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to provide tax benefits for education, not retirement expen-
ses. These accounts can accept only cash contributions"" on
behalf of taxpayers under the age of eighteen. 10 Contrib-
utions are limited to $500 per year,10 6 and are phased-out
for high-income contributors. 07 Income on deposits within
the account is not taxed as earned,08 and distributions of
the income for qualified higher education expenses are
excludable from income.' 9 Contributions are withdrawn as
a tax-free return of capital. Qualifying expenses are more
broadly defined than they are for the education tax credits,
and include required books, supplies, and equipment, as
well as the standard tuition and fees."0 Also, room and
board are qualifying expenses for students who are at least
"half-time," as that term is defined in Section 25A(b)(3) of
the tax code."' The price to be paid for the benefit is income
inclusion of all earnings carried out by a non-qualifying
distribution, plus a ten percent penalty thereon;". but
some exceptions Rrevent harsh results for a number of
special situations. ' Also, Congress has now made clear
that funds remaining in an Ed IRA after the beneficiary
reaches age thirty must be either distributed to the
beneficiary"' or "rolled-over" into another qualifying Ed
IRA." 6 A required distribution would not only cause all the
account income to be included in income, but the ten
percent tax penalty would apply as well. Finally, the gift
tax rules applicable to QSTP contributions and
distributions apply equally to Ed IRAs." 7
104. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 1998)
105. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1998).
106. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A)(iii) (West 1998)
107. See I.R.C. § 530(c) (West 1998).
108. See I.R.C. § 530(a) (West 1998).
109. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(2)(A) (West 1998).
110. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(2)(A) (West 1998) (incorporating the definition of
"qualifying expenses" of I.R.C. § 529(e)(3) and denying double benefits to stu-
dents who receive scholarships, federally sanctioned education assistance or
tax-free receipts, other than ones excluded from income under I.R.C. § 102,
attributable to attendance at an educational institution).
111. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(2)(B) (West 1998).
112. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(1) (West 1998).
113. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(4)(A) (West 1998).
114. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(4)(B) (West 1998).
115. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(8) (West 1998), as amended by IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998 § 6004(a)(D)(2)(c).
116. See id.
117. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(3) (West 1998).
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Although there are a number of new opportunities, each
carries with it substantial restrictions. Additionally, the
ubiquitous income level phase-outs effectively eliminate the
benefits for a group of taxpayers, many of whom need the
assistance because they cannot qualify for other need-based
benefits. To the extent meaningful relief was sought, the
effort fell short.
V. THE ROADS NOT TRAVELED
A. Alternative Avenues
If the underlying premise that drove the tax initiatives
is sound-an educated workforce is essential to a vibrant,
future economy-then some type of governmental support
to achieve this goal may well be warranted. For years, the
government has provided college students access to money
through a federal loan and grant program"8 and limited tax
benefits."' Apparently, these efforts were deemed
insufficient, and more assistance was considered both
wanted and needed. The critical question became how to
best provide it.
There were a number of other alternatives available,
some not tax related. Many, however, are quite dramatic
and probably impractical for fiscal, administrative, or
political reasons. For example, the government could
establish its own federal university system and operate the
colleges itself. Tuition could be pegged to the student's
ability to pay on a sliding scale resulting in lower tuition for
the less well-to-do. Alternatively, the entire education could
be provided free. The cost of such an endeavor is, of course,
prohibitive. Moreover, most citizens undoubtedly would
view the idea of adding to the already vast number of
governmental activities as ludicrous. Enrollments suggest
the mix of state operated and private post-secondary and
118. The Stafford Loan and Pell Grant programs have been available for
many years. There are also Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity
Grants and Federal Perkins Loans for selected students, as well as Robert C.
Byrd Honors Scholarships and Paul Douglas Teacher, Teacher Corps and
Robert Noyce Scholarships. For a discussion of these and other benefits, see
DAvED L. GIBBERMAN, PLANNING TO FINANCE YOUR CHILD'S COLLEGE EDUCATION,
19-48 (3d ed. 1994).
119. See supra notes 11-34 and accompanying text.
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vocational institutions is more than adequate to meet
current needs.
Another non-tax related option would be to institute a
national higher education voucher system. Under it, each
student would receive a voucher worth a certain dollar
amount per year usable to pay tuition or other qualifying
education expenses. The student would remit the voucher to
the educational institution which, in turn, would then
submit it to the government for payment. The voucher
system has been widely discussed as an alternative to the
current funding of public elementary school systems. In
those instances, however, the motivating force behind the
voucher system is not cost, but providing parents a greater
choice in their children's education because the public
system may be failing or not meeting parental expectations.
A voucher system would, nonetheless, allow parents to
recover some of their tax dollars paid to support public
schools while they send their children to private schools.
Thus, indirectly, their own children's educations also
receive some public support.
The downside to a federal voucher system is its cost. It
would involve not only the actual dollar outlay for tuition,
but also administrative costs to establish and maintain the
system. The voucher outlay per student mathematically
would be more expensive than any tax-based tuition credit
plan. Under a voucher system each student receives an
equal amount. Under a tax credit system there is a
maximum credit amount, but not all taxpayers will receive
it. Some taxpayers will not have sufficient means to
generate a tax liability equal to the full credit amount.
Thus, absent instituting a refundable credit, a tax credit
system should be less expensive. Also, the costs associated
with operating a federal voucher system bureaucracy are
too frightening a matter to allow the proposal to get any
serious attention. For similar reasons, a universally
guaranteed federal scholarship program is also
unthinkable.
Reasonable tax-related alternatives to the new tax
regime do exist. For example, if the purpose of allowing tax
relief for higher education expenses is to create a better
prepared workforce, why not tie the deduction into reaching
that result? Amending Section 162 of the Code or enacting a
new Code provision to permit a deduction for education
expenses after the student enters the workforce would move
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toward reaching that result.2 ° Present law prohibits any
deduction for non-working students because they are
neither pursuing a trade or business nor engaged in any
income producing activity. For similar reasons, these costs
presently cannot be capitalized and then amortized after
the student begins to work. But there is no impediment to
changing this rule by creating an "education asset." The
cost recovery period could be either the taxpayer's life
expectancy, or the difference between the number of years
from graduation 2 to a statutorily presumed retirement
date. Alternatively, Congress could set any arbitrary time
period over which the costs could be recovered once the
taxpayer otherwise qualifies under Section 162 of the tax
code. Certain business start-up costs are treated this way,
122
why not work preparation expenses? Moreover, how can one
challenge a five-year or ten-year amortization period as
being unreasonable when Congress now allows taxpayers to"expense" higher education costs, 12  which essentially
creates a one-year amortization period?
The selling point to the amortization proposal is cost
and goal satisfaction. It should be less costly than direct
write-offs or credits because not all students will enter the
workforce, and thus some expenses will never be deductible.
Also, by deferring the deduction and then spreading it over
a period of years, the government will lose less revenue in
the early years and should obtain some "time value of
money" benefit attributable to the deferred deductions.
Second, the deduction would be available only to those who
actually fulfilled the motivating purpose for the benefit-
improving one's skills to be a productive member of the
120. For a detailed discussion of applying a cost recovery system to tax
account for education expenses, see David S. Davenport, Education and Human
Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 793, 881-931 (1992). In this article the author also suggests that a
student realize income on the difference between the full future value of her
education and the actual out-of-pocket cost for it. See id. Under the suggested
system, the realized income would be added to other costs to establish the
student's basis that is to be recovered. See id.
121. For education expenses that were not part of a degree program and did
not result in a "graduation date", the recovery period could begin to run from
the later of the date the expense was paid or the education ended.
122. See I.R.C. § 195 (West 1998).
123. The Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits permit a current
benefit for qualifying expenses. See supra notes 67-94 and accompanying text.
As such it is similar to an immediate "write-off' or "expensing" of these costs.
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workforce. Clearly, this approach has some theoretical and
financial appeal.
Another alternative would be to exclude from income
some amount of a taxpayer's earnings that is based upon
the additional income generated by the taxpayer's "edu-
cation asset." Ideally, one would like to exclude a
percentage of income attributable to the "education asset"
itself. Doing so would truly provide the incentive to improve
one's job skills. But computing this figure would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Who could say with
complete accuracy what job and pay rate the taxpayer
would have had if he did not obtain the education?
Implementation of such a plan would necessitate reliance
upon tables based on statistical data for the incremental
income value of two-year, four-year, and professional
degrees. Additional tables for specialized training,
vocational and otherwise (including individual course
work), would also be needed. Once the data is tabulated,
simple tax schedules could be developed that would allow a
percent of the incremental value of the education to be
excluded from income each year for either a set number of
years, or the balance of the taxpayer's working years.
Retirement income generated by the "education asset"
earnings differential could be similarly treated. The
exclusion would work much like a depreciation deduction,
except the taxpayer would use the schedule to compute the
allowable exclusion instead of that year's allowable
depreciation deduction.
One immediately apparent problem with the exclusion
model is its complexity. Although the necessary information
to establish the tables is to some degree available,"4 it is not
particularly precise and would require continual updating.
Consequently, the proposal carries potentially high admin-
istrative costs, never a good attribute for a tax provision.
Along with its administrative drawbacks, the proposal
would add to an already overly complex tax code. But
perhaps its greatest drawback, and one shared by the
higher education expense amortization deduction proposal,
124. See, e.g., OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, PUB. NO. NCES 95-209,
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 399 (1995). The digest is published by the
National Center for Education Statistics pursuant to authority granted by the
National Education Statistics Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. 9001 § 402(b).
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is that at its core it is a cost recovery system. It may
encourage someone to obtain an education, but it does not
help pay the way at the time when the money is needed.
Taxpayers probably do not need the tax incentive to get an
education as much as the wherewithal to get it. For this
reason alone, both recovery system plans probably are in-
adequate alternatives to immediate benefits such as the
education tax credits.
Although each alternative proposal has its own
strengths, whether any is superior to the TRA '97 efforts
can only be determined with reference to the objective
sought. If the goal is generally to encourage people to
improve themselves because greater rewards will await
them, then the cost recovery systems may make the most
sense. If, however, the primary objective is to provide the
nation some financial assistance to become a better
equipped workforce, then the tax credits are more suited to
the task.
Regardless of the motivating criteria, one must question
whether TRA '97 met the articulated goal. Most of the
initiatives seem to be directed toward helping taxpayers
pay the cost of their education irrespective of whether the
education obtained is ever put to "workforce" use. The
principal emphasis of both education tax credits and
interest deductions is on tax relief for costs as they are
incurred by taxpayers. Whereas proposals to provide cost
recoveries and tax-free earnings for qualifying use provide
financial relief, they do so primarily only for taxpayers in
the future. Although some provisions offering future
benefits were enacted, they are quite limited. Seemingly
then, TRA '97 considers of paramount concern the need to
provide immediate relief for expenses as they are incurred.
A more central criticism of the newly introduced hodge-
podge of education tax incentives is that it does not focus
directly on perhaps the most important group-the future
students themselves. Yes, there are now tax credits to offset
tuition payments made by students. Yes, a tax deduction is
available for loan interest. And yes, the favorable tax
treatment for qualifying state tuition programs has been
enhanced. But each one of these benefits more naturally
targets the students' financial sponsors-their parents-
instead of the students themselves. The credits are
specifically made available for payments made on behalf of
[Vol. 47898
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dependents"--commonly, though not exclusively, a parent-
child relationship. The Code embellishes this position by
allowing full-time students up to age twenty-four to be
considered as dependents even though they might not
otherwise qualify as such.' Deductible loan interest will
largely benefit parents, if for no other reason than many
students will not have any income against which the deduc-
tion can be taken. The pre-paid tuition programs clearly
target parents, or other benefactors, who are willing to
make college-related payments many years prior to the
students enrolling in college. The new Ed IRA also appears
to be a vehicle designed for financial sponsors to meet
future obligations. While it is true that allowing a trade or
business deduction for qualifying education expenses is"student specific", the benefit is not new and certainly was
not expanded by TRA '97. If anything, one could argue the
deduction was curtailed since selecting many of the new
benefits will negatively impact the deductibility of the
otherwise qualifying payments as a trade or business
expense.
2 7
B. A Student-Oriented Benefit Proposal
Congress's approach to solving the college cost crunch
seems misdirected. Perhaps it would have been better
served taking a cue from its efforts on the retirement
savings front. The two challenges share similarities.
Specifically, both are tangentially related to one's employ-
ment-retirement savings are created while employed and
enjoyed in post-work years; and college costs are often
incurred prior to employment in preparation of entering the
work force. Nonetheless, both have been addressed as
principally personal, non-business tax items. IRAs are not
related to one's trade or business, and are allowed as a
separate, personal deduction so long as there is earned
income up to the amount contributed. 28 Similarly, both the
125. See I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(A)(iii) (West 1998).
126. An individual over the age of 19 who receives more than one-half of his
support from another taxpayer is treated as a dependent of the taxpayer if such
individual earns more than the dependency deduction amount. See I.R.C. §
151(c)(1)(B) (West 1998). But if the individual is a full-time student, the
dependency deduction is nonetheless allowed. See id.
127. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25A(g)(5) (West 1998).
128. See I.R.C. § 219(b)(1)(B) (West 1998).
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Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits are
available as long as there are qualifying education
expenses. Further, these credits are totally unrelated to
whether the student ever puts the education to use in a
trade or business.
The difference between the two solutions provided by
the Code is that in structuring the personal retirement tax
benefits, the direct focus is on the individual benefited. The
deduction or deferral enures principally to the benefit of the
taxpayer who is the qualifying contributor. The education
expense benefits seem to be geared to a student's sponsor or
sponsors. The logic to this approach is that most traditional
students do not have the financial ability to pay their own
expenses, and some tax benefit should go to their parents,
or other benefactors, who do. But perhaps the need for
external support would be less pressing if the Code was not
designed to tax future students, i.e., children, in such a way
that hampers their own ability to build up substantial
college funds. Some thought ought to be given to
eliminating or reducing the pernicious effect the current tax
rules have on allowing children to accumulate funds for
their own future college costs. Congress should re-order its
tax rules for providing college education expense benefits
along the lines of self-determinism that works well
elsewhere in the Code, specifically retirement funding.
The new specially designed Ed IRA is the closest TRA
'97 comes to encouraging individuals to plan for the future,
and providing incentives to those who will. These accounts
allow a tax deferral on the earnings generated by qualifying
contributions. But the annual contribution limit of $500, is
truly too small to make a serious dent in future educational
cost needs, even with a savvy investment program.129
129. Investing $500 per year for 18 years (the maximum number of years
contributions are allowed since no contribution can be made for child over age
18, see I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1998)) can produce a $22,800 fund if the
contributions grow at a compound annual rate of 10%. Although this is a tidy
sum, in order to achieve this result, consistent annual contributions have to be
made starting in the child's year of birth, and a 10% growth rate must be
sustained throughout the term. It may be quite difficult for many taxpayers to
begin funding an Ed IRA that early in the child's life, especially since the
contribution is not tax-deductible. Additionally, sustaining such a growth rate
might be difficult. Moreover, if past history is any indication, 18 years hence the
cost of higher education will have sufficiently increased so that the $22,800
probably will cover a relatively smaller portion of the overall cost of the
education than a similar amount would today.
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Increasing the annual contribution limit ($2,000 has
already been recommended 130) will help, but it still does not
create the same saving incentive as would an immediate
tax deduction for the contribution as is allowed for
retirement IRAs.' Moreover, the provision presumes con-
tributions will come from persons other than the student
and it places an income level cap on those contributors
which can frustrate the purpose to be served. Nonetheless,
conceptually the Ed IRA is a sound approach to the problem
of providing adequate funds for future student expenses. It
can, however, be improved, especially insofar as focusing
attention on the future students themselves is concerned.
Since the Ed IRA is designed to benefit future students,
fashioning changes to meet their needs makes sense.
Particularly useful would be innovations that encourage
self-determinism and cut into the harsh tax treatment
accorded tax dependents and young children. Consider the
current rules for tax dependents and young children, and
how an improved Ed IRA could help negate their impact on
a child's ability to plan for his or her future.
The tax code may well be guilty of child abuse. For tax
purposes, a child is anyone under the age of twenty-four
who qualifies as a dependent of his or her parent(s), or some
other person. 3' As long as the child can be taken as a
dependent by another, the child loses his or her own per-
sonal dependency deduction, irrespective of whether or not
the taxpayer entitled to the deduction uses it.' This, in
turn, triggers the possibility of a reduced standard
130. A Senate bill to increase the annual contribution limit to $2,000 was
introduced shortly after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was enacted.
Subsequently, Congress passed the Education Savings and School Excellence
Act of 1998, H.R. 2646, 105tb Cong. § 101(B), which would have increased the
annual contribution limit to $2,000; see also S. 1133, 105th Cong. (1997). The
President vetoed the entire bill July 24, 1998, and thus the $500 limit remains
in place. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A)(iii) (West 1998).
131. See I.R.C. § 219(a) (West 1998) (allowing a deduction for the "qualified
retirement contributions," as defined in I.R.C. § 219(c) (West 1998)).
132. See I.R.C. § 530(c) (West 1998).
133. This age limit applies because a full-time student under age 24 can still
qualify as a dependent of another taxpayer notwithstanding the fact that the
student earns more than the maximum amount of income allowed to be
considered a dependent of another. See supra note 126; I.R.C. § 151(c)(1)(A), (B)
(West 1998).
134. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(2) (West 1998). The Code forces this result by using
the word "allowable" not "allowed" when referring to the personal exemption
deduction. See id.
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deduction for the dependent."5 For tax year 1997, tax
dependents were permitted only a $650 standard deduction
for unearned income," 6 substantially less than the $4,150
available to a single taxpayer who is not someone else's
dependent. Without a dependency deduction and limited to
a reduced standard deduction, the dependent taxpayer will
pay tax on income in excess of $650-a sharp difference
from the $6,800 that normally can be shielded from income
by non-dependent, single taxpayers. 1 7 At a minimum, the
disparate treatment can amount to a $922 tax bill.18
The situation is even worse for younger taxpayers. The
"minor children" tax ("kiddie tax")3 9 potentially forces
children under age fourteen to have a portion of their
income taxed at their parent's marginal tax rate. All earned
income plus a pre-set amount of unearned income (usually
twice the amount of the standard deduction allowed to a
dependent taxpayer) is excluded from the grasp of the
kiddie tax," but all else is not. Thus, a child whose parents'
marginal tax rate is twenty-eight percent will incur a
$1,637 tax bill 141 on the $6,800 of unearned income that can
escape taxation completely for a non-dependent, single
taxpayer. For young children of higher income taxpayers,
the burden can be worse.' The tax penalty for being a
135. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(5) (West 1998), which limits the standard for deduc-
tion for dependent taxpayers to the greater of a set dollar amount ($650 for tax
year 1997, which includes the allowable inflationary adjustment) or the tax-
payer's earned income plus $250. The $250 amount does not come into play
when the taxpayer's earned income equals or exceeds the basic standard
deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 63(c).
136. But see I.R.C. § 63(c)(5)(B), amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1201(a)(1), 111 Stat. 993 (preventing a complete loss of the
statutory amount for dependents who have some earned income). Now a
dependent taxpayer is allowed as part of her standard deduction up to $250 in
excess of her earned income. See id.
137. This amount is the sum of the standard deduction ($4,150) and the
dependency deduction ($2,650) for tax year 1997.
138. This is the product of multiplying $6,150 (the difference between
$6,800 and $650) by 15%, the lowest marginal tax rate. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(c)
(West 1998).
139. See I.R.C. § 1(g) (West 1998).
140. See I.R.C. § 1(g)(4)(A)(ii) (West 1998).
141. This amount is computed as follows: $1,540 which is $5,500 (the excess
of $6,800 over $1,300) taxed at the parents' 28% rate, plus $97, which is the
child's 15% tax rate applied to the $650 of the $1,300, neither protected by the
standard deduction nor subject to the kiddie tax. (The computations use the
limits in place for tax year 1997).
142. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(c) (West 1998) (applying to joint return filers, heads of
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dependent child is not insignificant.
Congress should move to ameliorate the tax hardships
of being a dependent child in a way that increases the
opportunity to fund higher education costs. This can be
accomplished by restructuring the Ed IRA to allow
dependent children taxpayers an increased annual
contribution limit. The increase should offset the penalty
associated with being a tax dependent. The revised limit
should equal the sum of the (1) lost dependency exemption
deduction; plus (2) disqualified portion of the standard
deduction. Allowing annual Ed IRA contributions based on
this figure, the "dependent's reduced exemption and
standard deductions amount," would serve as a fitting cure
to present ills. Alternatively, the contributions could be
made deductible. The benefit allowed in computing adjusted
gross income would ensure its availability to taxpayers who
do not itemize their deductions. Finally, irrespective of
which option, if any, is pursued, the income limit on Ed IRA
contributors should be re-worked.
Although combining an increased cap with deductible
contributions would best meet the taxpayer's need, the cost
of such an approach would prove prohibitive. Given the
choice between the two options, the increased annual
contribution limit is preferable. Whereas deductible
contributions are the better incentive for Ed IRA funding,
this option may not have universal appeal. First, many
children, especially those of middle-income and lower-
income families, will not have sufficient income to exceed
even the reduced dependent child tax threshold. Therefore
the deduction would be of no value to any of these
taxpayers, irrespective of whether the parent supplied the
funds for the contribution. (This specific objection can be
eliminated if the deduction is given to the contributor. As
long as a meaningful income level limit on qualifying
contributors is imposed, such an approach may be
defendable.) Second, merely providing a deduction will not
necessarily satisfy a primary objective-increasing the -size
of the fund available to meet future expenses.' On the
households and other unmarried individuals, respectively, and providing for
marginal tax rates of up to 39.6%). Thus, the kiddie tax could be more costly for
the child whose parents' tax rate is at the higher end of the rate structure. See
id.
143. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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other hand, increasing the annual contribution limit will
provide taxpayers the opportunity to maximize Ed IRA
funds that will be available in the future. Moreover, it is a
more equitable approach because it is tax neutral to all. It
is axiomatic that graduated marginal tax rates give higher
income taxpayers a greater benefit for deductions than
lower income taxpayers. Thus, a greater benefit enures to
more well-to-do taxpayers when contributions are made
deductible. This "upside down" inequity is eliminated if no
deduction is involved. The increased Ed IRA contribution
limit both fosters self-determinism and offers the
opportunity today to make a meaningful effort to meet
tomorrow's needs. Therefore, it merits the most serious
consideration.
As previously discussed, Ed IRAs accept non-deductible
contributions, the income from which is excused from tax so
long as funds remain in the account.' Distributions are
tax-free if made for qualifying purposes;.. other
distributions are may be included in income,146 and may be
subject to a ten percent penalty as well.14 The Code imposes
a $500 limit on annual contributions to Ed IRAs, 4 and
disallows contributions from upper income level tax-
payers.49 These latter two restrictions seriously hamper Ed
144. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(2) (West 1998); supra notes 104-08 and accom-
panying text.
145. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(2)(A) (West 1998); supra notes 110-11 and accom-
panying text.
146. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(1) (West 1998) (providing the general rule that
distributions are includible in gross income according to the rules of I.R.C. § 72
(b) (West 1998)). I.R.C. § 72(b) sets out the "exclusion ratio" for amounts
received from an annuity. Application of the ratio will result in contributions
being received tax-free, and all earnings thereon included in income unless
otherwise protected elsewhere in the section. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(2)(B) (making
it clear that distributions in excess of the tax year's qualifying expenses are to
be included in income on a pro rata basis).
147. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(4)(A) (West 1998).
148. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A)(iii) (West 1998).
149. See I.R.C. § 530(c) (West 1998) (establishing a formula for reducing the
annual maximum contribution amount allowable based upon the contributor's
"modified gross income"-adjusted gross income plus amounts "excluded from
under section 911, 931, or 933"). See also I.R.C. § 530(d)(2) (West 1998). The
phase-out begins for taxpayers whose modified gross incomes exceed $150,000
for joint filers and $95,000 for other filers. See I.R.C. § 530(c)(1)(A) (West 1998).
Joint filers with modified adjusted gross incomes in excess of $160,000, and




IRA effectiveness. Each is of dubious value relative to
stated overarching policy goals, and should be either elim-
inated or substantially modified in order to achieve the
determined objectives of providing a reasonable means for
taxpayers to plan for future higher education expenses
when they might not otherwise be able to do so.
Consider first the income limitation on potential
contributors. The purpose of the restriction seems clear -
high-income taxpayers do not need tax breaks, and thus
ought not to be given any additional federal assistance in
saving for their own or their beneficiaries' college costs. The
limitation is directed principally at the parent(s) or finan-
cial sponsor(s) of the future student, although it applies to
the latter as well. 5 °
The income limitation is politically popular; it allows
Congress to "pitch the plan" as being intended only for low-
income and middle-income taxpayers. Consequently, the
revenue loss generated by the benefit can be justified on the
grounds the relief is directed exclusively to the deserving
needy. This is a consistent theme for all of the new
"education expense" benefits. 5' For the Ed IRA, however, it
may be only a "paper tiger," and a costly one at that.
The Code places reporting requirements on the Ed IRA
trustee.'52  Regulations that flesh out the reporting
requirements will be necessary. These regulations should
identify who will be responsible for verifying income
limitation compliance. Ed IRA contributions will be made to
a trustee, presumably a bank or other financial institution
that offers similar services for retirement plans.'' Will the
150. There is no restriction on children making contributions to their own
Ed IRAs. They would, however, be subject to the income limitation rules. See
I.R.C. § 530(c) (West 1998). Whereas it is unlikely a child would run afoul of the
limit, it is possible for it to happen. The limit does not apply exclusively to
earned income, so children who have received large gifts, inheritances or other
windfalls, or who have trust income, which results in substantial unearned
income could be subjected to the limit. See id.
151, See I.R.C. § 25A(d) (West 1998) (establishing income limitations on
both the Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits); I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)
(West 1998) (establishing income limitations on the education interest
deduction). There are no such limitations for qualified state tuition plan
contributions under I.R.C. § 529 (West 1998).
152. See I.R.C. § 530(h) (West 1998).
153. I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(B) qualifies those entities that may serve as Ed IRA
trustees. It specifically refers to banks qualified to serve as IRA custodians as
set out in I.R.C. § 408(n), and allows other persons who have demonstrated the
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trustee be required to gather relevant income information
before accepting contributions or, as is presently the case
with retirement IRAs, will the trustee accept all payments
and see the burden of proving eligibility fall on the
contributor through some form filing procedure? Either
alternative puts an extra administrative layer in place and
adds some cost to this obtaining benefit. One can be fairly
certain that trustees' fees will rise to meet any compliance
cost expense imposed upon them. Alternatively, all tax-
payers will share the cost generated by printing, dissem-
inating, and auditing tax forms if the limit is made self-
enforcing.
Perhaps what renders the income limit more
problematic is that it can so easily be circumvented. The
provision does not impose either a "tracing" or "attribution"
rule as can be found in other Code sections.' Consequently,
a high-income taxpayer otherwise ineligible to make an Ed
IRA contribution could transfer funds to the minor, who in
turn would make the contribution. (For children lacking
capacity to execute the transaction, a simple custodial
arrangement pursuant to the local transfer to minors act
can be used.'5 ) Since both of these transfers are considered
gifts of present interests and qualify for the annual
exclusion,56 there is no gift tax penalty for choosing one
option over the other. As such, the decision to elect to make
an Ed IRA contribution either directly or indirectly is gift
tax neutral. There may, however, be an income tax
advantage for opting to take the indirect route, i.e.;
transferring the gift to the minor who then makes the Ed
ability to administer individual retirement plans to qualify.
154. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2040(a) which "traces" gifts back to the donor for pur-
poses of determining a donor-decedent's contribution to joint estates in order to
determine the value includible in the decedents gross estate under I.R.O. §
2031 (West 1998). See also I.R.C. § 318(a) (West 1998) (establishing rules
attributing stock ownership from one individual or entity to others for a variety
of income tax purposes identified in I.R.C. § 318(b) (West 1998)).
155. See, e.g., the Illinois Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, 760 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 20/1 (West 1992) (recognizing custodial accounts). Id. 20/5, 20/10(2)
(authorizing custodians to use custodial funds in a variety of ways for the
benefit of the minor).
156. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (excluding the first $10,000 of transfers of present
interests from being considered a "gift" for gift tax purposes). The $10,000 is
adjusted for inflation and will increase in $1,000 increments in the future. See
id. § 2503(b)(2). Gifts made pursuant to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act
qualify for the annual exclusion. See Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212.
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IRA contribution. In lieu of transferring cash to the minor,
a high-income taxpayer can gift appreciated property,
which the minor can then sell to generate the cash needed
to meet the Ed IRA contribution requirements. 15 7 This
maneuver results in all gain being shifted from the presum-
ably higher marginal rates of the donor-benefactor to the
lower rates of the minor.5 ' For children under age fourteen
the kiddie tax will apply, but there is still the possibility of
sheltering from tax income equal to up to twice the amount
of a child's limited standard deduction.'59 In any event, even
if a tax benefit cannot be achieved, no income tax penalty
results from following this procedure.
The contributor income limit can also be attacked on"consistency" grounds. If the limit is designed to put the Ed
IRA on the same playing field as the other education tax
benefits, the effort missed its mark. The income limit on the
education tax credits and the education interest expense
deduction are "individual use" oriented. That is, the
restriction is applied to the taxpayer claiming the benefit,
i.e., the person paying either the expenses that qualify for
the credit, or the interest on the loan. Thus, parents who
pay for their child's qualifying expenses receive the tax
credit or the interest deduction. Also, the availability of that
credit or deduction is measured against the parent's income
at the time the credit or deduction is claimed, not when the
income used to pay the credit was earned or the qualifying
loan proceeds were used to pay college costs. The true
benefit of the Ed IRA is not making the contributions, but
receiving the earnings on a tax-free basis. Thus, if an
income limit is to be imposed, consistency suggests it ought
to be used at the time of withdrawal-the tax year the
157. See I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 1998) (stating that an Ed IRA can
only accept cash contributions).
158. A gift is not a taxable event for income tax purposes. See Campbell v.
Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954). But see Diedrich v. Comm'r, 457 U.S. 191
(1982) (ruling that donor realized income on gift to extent donee assumed
liability in excess of donor's basis). All of the pre-transfer appreciation is essen-
tially passed on to the donee through the basis rules of I.R.C. § 1015 (West
1998). Thus, a sale by the donee will shift the income tax consequences on the
pre-transfer appreciation from the donor to the donee. For a complete discussion
of the income tax benefits associated with gift-giving, see Malcolm L. Morris,
The Tax Posture of Gifts in Estate Planning: Dinosaur or Dynasty? 64 NEB. L.
REV. 25, 27-44 (1985).
159. See supra note 140.
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benefit is to be elected. 6 ' Currently, however, the income
limit operates as though the Ed IRA is a retirement vehicle
(which, despite its name, it is not), applying restrictions at
the time of contribution instead of at withdrawal.'' Section
135 of the tax code, a provision clearly analogous to Section
530, applies its income limits when the bond proceeds are
used, not when the bonds are purchased. For the sake of
consistency and fairness, the Ed IRA income limits, if they
must exist, ought to be applied only when the funds are
withdrawn. Such a change would more closely align the Ed
IRA with its education benefit confreres, and move it away
from the traditional IRA which, at best, is a distant cousin.
In sum, there seems to be no sound "tax" reason for
retaining the "contributor income" limit. Unlike the income
limits imposed in the other new education expense benefit
provisions, this one can be circumvented.6 2  Since
contributors can work around the limit without much dif-
ficulty, and perhaps may even have an income tax incentive
to do so, what purpose does it serve? Admittedly, there may
be some political advantage in crafting a provision that
technically provides tax benefits to lower-income and
middle-income taxpayers to the exclusion of their more
well-to-do counterparts. But in this case, the spirit of the
rule falls prey to reality. First, the cut-off point is arbi-
trarily drawn and cannot be said to be a useful guide in
separating middle-income from upper-income taxpayers.
This is especially true in that there is no distinction for
taxpayers with more than one child. Second, the potential
compliance costs for enforcing this falsely perceived
"fairness" may be too high, and that alone justifies
eliminating the limit. Perhaps more importantly,
consistency with other education tax benefit sections dictate
that the income limitation be reconsidered.
160. Since the education tax credits and Ed IRA income exclusion benefits
are mutually exclusive, the Code gives the taxpayer the option to pick the
preferred benefit. See I.R.C § 530(d)(2)(C) (West 1998) (allowing the taxpayers
to waive the benefits of tax-free withdrawal of deferred earnings). A similar
election is found in I.R.C. § 25A(e)(1) (West 1998) with respect to taking the
education tax credits. See also I.R.C. § 25A(e)(2) (coordinating the benefits of
I.R.C. §§ 25A, 530 (West 1998)).
161. See I.R.C. § 219(g)(1)-(3) (West 1998) (placing income limits on
deductible contributions for a taxpayer, or a taxpayer's spouse, who is an active
participant in another qualified retirement plan). See id. § 219(g)(5).
162. See discussion supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47908
EDUCATION EXPENSE
Far more significant than the contributor's income level
limit is the cap imposed on the annual contribution
amounts to Ed IRAs. As noted, the $500 per year maximum
contribution probably will not provide a substantial portion
of the total funds needed for a full four-year college degree.
Even if one were to consider the Ed IRA funds to be only
complementary to other education-based tax incentives, the
plan falls short. The new credits and other benefits are just
too small to meet the need, especially given that some of the
benefits are mutually exclusive in any given tax year.'63
Although prudent investing of consistent contributions in
an Ed IRA could cover the full cost of less ambitious
educational objectives, instituting a policy designed to
achieve minimal targets is disingenuous at best.
The Ed IRA, however, has the potential to become a
powerful college cost-funding vehicle and serve as the
centerpiece for most low-income and middle-income
families' education expense planning. This can be accom-
plished by raising the annual contribution amount. Raising
the amount to $1,000 or $2,000 would provide a
conscientious contributor the opportunity to generate
meaningful college funds."6
The suggested dollar figures are at the lower end of
what would be an acceptable contribution cap. The higher
the cap, the better the Ed IRA can serve the needs of the
college-bound populace or, where appropriate, its financial
sponsors. One way to permit increased contributions and
ameliorate the negative impact of being a dependent
taxpayer, is to interrelate the two. Thus, it is suggested
that the cap rise in inverse proportion to the amount of
benefit lost by reason of being a dependent taxpayer-the
"dependent's reduced exemption and standard deductions
amount."
This proposal does not come without a cost, but there
163. The mutual exclusivity of benefits only applies on a per student basis.
Thus, for example, a taxpayer with more than one qualifying dependent in any
given tax year could utilize a Hope Scholarship credit for one dependent and
make a tax-free withdrawal from an Ed IRA for another.
164. Annual contributions of $1,000 earning a 10% rate of return will create
a fund worth approximately $15,000 in 10 years and $33,000 in 18 years. When
the annual contribution is increased to $2,000, the fund at the end of 10 years is
worth $35,000, and at the end of 18 years is worth $100,000. These figures
assume no withdrawal during the term and contributions made at the
beginning of each year.
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are safeguards to prevent an overwhelming revenue loss.
Some are internal, having been built into the section itself.
Others are external, the result of the interplay of the
section with other tax rules.
Consider first the externalities at play that canminimize the overall tax cost incident to increasing the
annual contribution cap in relation to the "dependent's
reduced exemption and standard deduction amount." The
new benefit could be fully available for only dependent
children who have reportable taxable income. Presently,
this would equate to $5,850,165 but it is unlikely many
children would qualify for the full-proposed amount. A child
would need to have substantial reportable unearned income
to reach the proposed cap. Children with earned income
would not necessarily benefit from the proposed increased
cap because their standard deductions are not always
limited. A dependent taxpayer is entitled to a standard
deduction equal to his or her earned income up to the full
amount allowable to non-dependent taxpayers. 66 Also,
children who work can reduce their taxable incomes by
making contributions to traditional IRAs.'67 By doing so,
they may achieve the same, if not a better, benefit offered
by an Ed IRA.'68 Thus, there is already an incentive for
these taxpayers to make tax-favored contributions to an
IRA. Since would-be contributors must choose which IRA to
fund (contributions cannot exceed a set amount regardless
what type of IRA is used), the proposal would not generate
165. This represents the sum of (a) the $2,350 dependency exemption, and
(b) $3,500-the difference between the $4,150 single taxpayer standard
deduction and the $650 allowed dependent taxpayers.
166. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(5)(B) (West 1998).
167. Deductible contributions to a traditional IRA are based on earned
income. See I.R.C. § 219(f)(1) (West 1998). The deduction is used in computing
adjusted gross income, so it is available to the taxpayer regardless of whether or
not an election to itemize deductions has been made. See I.R.O. § 62(a)(7) (West
1998).
168. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) (West 1998) (allowing distributions from an IRA
for qualifying higher education expenses to avoid the normal 10% early
withdrawal penalty). See id. § 72(t)(1). Thus, I.R.C. § 72(t)(7)(A) incorporates
the definition of I.R.C. § 529(e)(3) (West 1998) for purposes of identifying
"qualifying expenses." Although the withdrawn funds must be included in
income, the benefit of penalty-free tax-deferred growth is obtained. The only
added advantage of the Ed IRA is the tax-free withdrawal of the deferred
earnings. Although in the traditional IRA withdrawn contributions may be
included in income, that will only be true for those contributions which were
deductible when made. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(1).
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the full amount of expected revenue loss. The proposal,
however, effectively would extend a college expense savings
incentive presently available only for working children to
non-working dependent children with unearned income.
Also, the "bunching" effect (income earned over a period of
years being withdrawn in one tax year) could push the
taxpayer into a substantially higher tax bracket than would
have been applicable during the years the income was
actually earned. This should eliminate most of the benefits
associated with the income tax accounting deferral, and
further deter individuals from funding Ed IRAs with non-
educational objectives in mind. Finally, transfers by parents
to Ed IRAs on behalf of their children would constitute
taxable gifts and have the potential to generate transfer tax
liabilities. On the other hand, direct payments for college
tuition by parents, or others are entirely excused from gift
tax. 9 Thus, there are gift tax reasons to believe parents
will not be so quick to fund Ed IRAs, even when some
favorable income tax advantages are available.
The internal safeguards are equally effective cost
control measures. Stringent withdrawal and transfer rules,
together with applicable penalties, eliminate the incentive
to create "tax-free" pocketbooks for children. Distributions
of income that are not used for qualified expenses will be
subject to tax, and a penalty, as well. Also, the beneficiary-
taxpayer will only be able to use the benefit when certain
other ones are not available. The current "no double
benefit" rule for Ed IRAs would still apply. Finally, and
quite importantly, Ed IRAs intrinsically do not provide any
benefit that cannot otherwise be obtained. Remember, the
taxpayer is not receiving a deduction for the contribution,
but only excluding from income the earnings thereon.
Distribution of the contributions themselves is treated as a
return of capital and will be tax neutral. A would-be
contributor could just as easily invest funds in a tax-free
bond trust and receive similar tax treatment. The earnings
would be tax-free, as would the return of the original
investment. Moreover, if the investment appreciated in
value, it would qualify for favorable capital gains rates;70 if
it declined in value a deductible loss would probably be
169. See I.R.C. § 2503(e)(1), (2)(A) (West 1998).
170. See I.R.C. § 1(g) (West 1998).
1999] 911
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
available.'' Neither is true for Ed IRAs. Although
recognized asset appreciation will escape taxation if
distributed for qualifying expenses, the trade-off is ordinary
income tax treatment plus a potential penalty for non-
qualified distributions; and in no event can a deduction ever
be had if the underlying investments are sold at a loss.
Additionally, revising the contributor income level rules
can eliminate some potential revenue loss. As earlier
suggested, the limitation should be applied when
distributions, rather than contributions, are made. By doing
so, high-income taxpayers will not qualify to reap the
benefit of income exclusion, although in these instances
penalties should not be imposed. Moreover, the rules could
operate similarly to those for the education credits, i.e., as
long as the student was still a tax dependent, the income
level of the taxpayer entitled to the deduction would
apply. Such a rule would help prevent wholesale
assignment of income-type transfers, and maintain the
notion that the benefit is targeted to the needier taxpayers.
Even if no other changes to Section 530 of the Code are
made, the income contributor limitation should be revisited
to determine its efficacy. Implementing the suggested
changes will harmonize the restrictions with those of other
Code sections. The end result will be a more consistent and
appropriate tax policy.
There are ample reasons to believe expanding the Ed
IRA annual contribution cap will not result in an
overwhelming rush of dollars into these accounts so as to
create a "budget-buster." Undoubtedly, at some point the
Treasury would experience some downturn in revenues.
The total amount of tax-free withdrawals should exceed any
Ed IRA earnings required to be included in income plus
applicable penalties thereon. If this were not the case, there
would be no reason to use the tax code at all to address the
problem. But the critical question is whether the expanded
Ed IRA would successfully provide the financially
challenged portion of the population a meaningful
opportunity to meet the seemingly ever rising college costs
of their children-our future workforce. If answered in the
171. See I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (West 1998).
172. See I.R.C. § 25A(g)(3)(B) (West 1998). Moreover, this rule is not easily
avoided because in defining "dependent," I.R.C. § 152(a) does not make the
status elective. See supra note 134.
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affirmative, the revenue loss is justified. Hopefully,
Congress will take this view.
Any discussion directed to improving the Ed IRA that
excluded the prospect of making contributions deductible
would be incomplete. Clearly, immediate deductibility is a
powerful incentive for contributions. But the concept is not
problem-free. Some problems have already been identified,
others also exist.
The most serious objection to deductible Ed IRA
contributions is cost. Notwithstanding the current
contributor income level limit, there are just too many
taxpayers who would be eligible to take the deduction. Even
with the annual contribution cap at $500, this constitutes a
per beneficiary amount, and can easily add up to a tidy sum
per taxpayer. Of course, the cost for deductible contrib-
utions would be the loss of the tax-free withdrawals
entirely. Both the contributions and the deferred earnings
thereon would be included as income in the year
withdrawn. This would be more than a fair trade-off for
many taxpayers, especially if the deduction was given to the
high-income bracket contributor and the withdrawals were
reportable in income by a lower marginal bracket
beneficiary. This model might create too attractive an
assignment of income system for taxpayers to disregard.
Some objections can be addressed. The deductible
amount could be adjusted to minimize the cost. It could be
set at some percent of the amount contributed. Alter-
natively, the deduction could be allocated to the Ed IRA
beneficiary, and be made available for the dependent child
only as a method of minimizing the negative tax impact the
current rules have on dependent taxpayers. Perhaps some
fiscally responsible method of implementing a contribution
deduction plan can be established, but a detailed cost-
benefit analysis is in order before one is put into place. At
this point, deductible Ed IRA contributions appear beyond
reach.
Although deductible contributions may not be on the
horizon, increasing the annual contribution amount and
tinkering with the contributor income limit rules are
obtainable goals. These relatively simple changes can bring
big benefits. First, they will maximize the amount of money
that can actually be put toward the desired goal-meeting
college education expenses. The current rules are too
stringent in both the limited amount that can be put away,
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and the persons who qualify as contributors. Second, to the
extent the change will minimize the unduly harsh impact of
the kiddie tax and other child taxpayer rules, all the better.
If the purpose of the TRA '97 education package was to
help taxpayers pay the way for college costs, then the
improved Ed IRA complements that goal. Unlike some of
the new rules, it is clearly objective-specific and thus may
be better suited to meeting the stated goal. In any event, it
offers a more meaningful response to the increasing costs of
higher education by permitting taxpayers to make
substantial down payments on their futures. To the extent
approval has been given to similar state sponsored arrange-
ments-the Qualified State Tuition Plans-it seems to
make no sense to deny taxpayers without access to such
plans similar rights of self-determinism. Surely, the
retirement IRA was an appropriate response for taxpayers
not covered by employer-sponsored plans. The expanded Ed
IRA is an appropriate higher education expense analog.
CONCLUSION
The higher education expense tax rules are an unnec-
essarily complex set of intricately intertwined provisions.
Moreover, restrictive income barriers and interrelated
offsets impair their effectiveness. They do, however,
represent a good start to solving a legitimate issue. If one
accepts that the Code is a proper vehicle for providing this
type of assistance, then perhaps it is best to do the job right.
Present rules provide much too little. With some
innovation, Ed IRAs can be efficient college cost funds
providers. Increasing the annual contribution limit in
proportion to deduction amounts that are otherwise
unavailable to most children, provides a powerful incentive
for self-funding and dampens the harsh tax rules applied to
these individuals. Re-thinking the appropriate role of
contributor income limits is also in order. Congress should
not hesitate to improve upon its initial efforts and revitalize
Ed IRAs with its own educational expense epiphany.
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